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Abstract
We propose a model with some of the main demographic, economic and insti-
tutional factors usually considered to matter in the transition to modern growth.
We apply our theory to England over the period 1530-1860. We use the model to
measure the impact of mortality, population density and technological progress
on school foundations, literacy and growth through a set of experiments. We
find that one third of the rise in literacy over the period 1530-1850 can be di-
rectly related to the rise in population density, while one sixth is linked to higher
longevity and one half to exogenous total factor productivity growth. Moreover,
the timing of the effect of population density in the model is consistent with the
available evidence for England, where it is shown that schools were established
at a high rate over the period 1540-1620.
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1 Introduction
Economic growth, understood as the increase of the gross domestic product over a
long period of time, is a contemporaneous phenomenon. As clearly explained in
Maddison (2001), humanity has been caught in a very long lasting trap of economic
stagnation till the 19th century. This period was accompanied by an even more catas-
trophic demographic situation: according to the estimations of Maddison, the size of
the world population has almost remained constant in the first millennium, and life
expectancy (at birth) has been systematically below fifty years till the beginning of
the 20th century.
For European countries, such an evolution is traditionally associated with successive
mortality crises due to wars, famines and epidemics. Recent essays due to Platt (1996)
for the England case and Herlihy (1997) have stressed the structural changes induced
by the bubonic plague in late medieval ages. However, since Wrigley and Schofield
(1989), the view that a unitary premodern demographic regime has preceded the in-
dustrial revolution is seriously undermined, specially in the England case 1: births,
marriages and mortality have sharply fluctuated two centuries before the industrial
revolution, and such variations cannot be fully attributed to mortality crises. While
mortality decline has significantly contributed to population growth in England, its
effect was clearly overshadowed by rising fertility until 1820, driven notably by in-
creased nuptiality. Another major conclusion to draw from Wrigley and Schofield’s
careful empirical work in the England case is that mortality crises during the period
studied show up a low correlation with food scarcity, and thus with standard of living
of population.
Yet several issues remain unsettled on several grounds. In particular, even if we
agree with the demographic appraisal above, an ultimate step is to incorporate it
into a more global analysis of the transition to modern growth, and to identify the
involved economic and demographic mechanisms. Incidentally, the demographic
determinants have become increasingly advocated in the development literature (see
Lee (1979) and McNicoll (2003)). The unified growth theory, a recent stream of eco-
nomic growth literature, surveyed by Galor (2005), puts a special emphasis on the
1England is not an exception though: Ireland and Holland for example have some common histor-
ical demography trends with England, notably as to the preeminent role of fertility in the acceleration
of population growth compared to mortality in the middle of the 18th century. Sweden and France
exhibit a completely different picture.
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role of demographics in the transition to the modern economic growth regime. This
paper highlights specially the role of population density, among other demographic
and economic factors, in the economic development of England during the period
1530-1860. Since industrial revolutions rely on innovations, and the adoption of new
technologies requires a certain density of educated people, population density and
literacy are likely to be key variables in the development process. Indeed, the rise in
literacy and education in the pre-industrial era may have initiated the process lead-
ing to the Industrial Revolution. Cipolla (1969) argues that improvements in literacy
favored the Industrial Revolution in more than one way. It avoided shortages of
skilled workers in those fields in which such workers were specifically required and,
more generally, it mademore people adaptable to new circumstances and receptive to
change. In times of fast technological progress, literate workers assimilate new ideas
more readily.
Higher education achievements might have been triggered by several economic and
demographic factors. We distinguish three of them. First, technological progress
increased labor productivity and wage rates in the modern sector, and thereby the
return to investment in education. Facing better income perspectives in this sector,
households would engage in education to benefit from the higher returns. This view
is defended, among others, by Hansen and Prescott (2002), and Doepke (2004). Sec-
ond, improvements in adult longevity is another interesting candidate for explaining
the rise in literacy. Though, according to Wrigley and Schofield (1989), mortality de-
cline is not the main engine of population growth in pre-industrial England, increas-
ing longevity is potentially an important determinant of literacy: longer lives increase
the rate of returns to investment in education, inducing longer schooling, according
to the well known Ben-Porath mechanism. Two recent papers by Boucekkine, de la
Croix, and Licandro (2003) and Nicolini (2004) argue that lower mortality induced
higher investment in human capital and/or in physical capital at the time of the in-
dustrial revolution, therefore paving the way to future growth. On his side, Clark
(2005a) remarks that, if demographic transition and industrial revolution are the two
great forces that lead to modern growth, the latter did not lead to fertility decline till
over 100 years later. He explores the difficulties when trying to uncover the underly-
ing connection between them.
A third possibility is drawn from various authors who stress that the rising density of
population may have played a role in fostering the take-off. Higher density can lower
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the cost of education through facilitating the creation of schools. Fujita and Thisse
(2002) provide a textbook treatment of this effect. A representative empirical study is
the one of Ladd (1992) according to whom a small increase in density lowers the costs
of providing services, at least at very low levels of population density. There can also
be externalities generated by denser population. For Kremer (1993), high population
spurs technological change. For Galor and Weil (2000) and Lagerloef (2003) there is a
“population-induced” technological progress. Population needs to reach a threshold
for productivity to take-off.
In this paper we propose a new framework in order to disentangle the effects of the
three factors on literacy and economic growth in England, 1530-1860. In our the-
oretical framework, we introduce the three channels outlined above: technological
progress, mortality drops and population density. By looking at the linkages between
literacy, school establishment and income growth, we will be able to evaluate the role
of each of them. In our model, the length of schooling is chosen by individuals who
maximize life-time income, which depends on future wages, longevity, and the dis-
tance to the nearest school. Then, the number and location of education facilities is
determined, either chosen optimally by the state or following a free entry process
(market solution). Higher population density makes it optimal to increase school
density, opening the possibility to reach higher educational levels.
In our model, two sectors may coexist: a traditional sector with constant productivity,
and a modern sector with exogenously rising productivity. Moreover, the remunera-
tion of the workers in the modern sector also depends on their human capital level.
Therefore the transition to this modern sector depend on both technological evolution
and on education. As explained just above, a denser population induces a higher ed-
ucation level, which fastens the switch to the modern sector. Wrigley (1989) depicts
a more detailed and concrete picture of industrial revolution. A traditional sector,
called organic economy, merely based on agricultural goods, can eventually evolve
into a definitely more productive sector, an advanced organic economy, thanks to
animal power. However, such a regime cannot be sustainable because of fixed land
supply and decreasing marginal returns. The chance of England, argued Wrigley,
was to have abundant coal resources, which made somewhat comfortable the change,
namely the transition to amineral-based economy, which industries (producing iron,
pottery or glasses) could be operated without significant pressure on land, allowing
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therefore to escape from decreasing returns. Wrigley provides some empirical sup-
port to his story, specially based on collected investment data over the period studied.
Indeed, the mineral-based economy opened the door to a series of innovations (no-
tably in energy and power production) which brought productivity growth and real
wages much above the figures allowed by the agricultural economy. Our modeling
of the traditional and modern sectors is definitely much more stylized than Wrigley’s
description. It captures however a central message in the latter: the transition to mod-
ern economy features primarily an escape from decreasing returns. While in Wrigley,
this transition is made possible by the much broader set of technological opportu-
nities allowed by the mineral-based economy, it is additionally favored by human
capital accumulation, itself boosted by increasing population density, in our story.
As we have explained above, there are numerous good reasons to believe that rising
literacy was a key factor in the dawn of the modern growth regime.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the demographic, economic, geo-
graphic and institutional structures of our theoretical model. Section 3 describes the
data and the experimental methodology we use to disentangle the effects of the three
factors mentioned above on literacy and growth. Section 4 displays the findings and
section 5 contains some concluding comments.
2 Theory
In order to assess the development mechanisms outlined in the introduction, we first
build up a theoretical model with the relevant demographic, economic, institutional
and geographic ingredients. Hereafter, we display the main assumptions adopted.
The whole mathematical setting, including the rigorous proofs of the claims made
along Section 2 of this paper, can be found in Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Peeters
(2007).
2.1 The demographic structure
We shall consider an economy populated by overlapping cohorts. Individuals be-
longing to the cohort t, that is individuals born at date t, have an uncertain lifetime:
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their probability of reaching age a, is given by the following survival function:
mt(a) =
eβta − αt
1− αt ,
where αt and βt are two numbers (for fixed t). This survival function has been intro-
duced by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002). If αt and βt satisfy: αt > 1
and βt > 0, then the survival function is concave, i.e., the probability of death in-
creases with age, and there is a maximum age At that an individual can reach. This
parameter configuration allows the function mt(a) to accurately represent the empir-
ical adult survival laws, and has the advantage of being analytically tractable. The
maximum age is obtained by solving mt(At) = 0 and is equal to
At =
log(αt)
βt
.
Notice that a higher longevity of individuals belonging to cohort t corresponds to
larger αt and/or lower βt. Finally for sake of simplicity, we don’t explicitly model
fertility, and rather assume as (exogenously) given the size of each cohort, equal to
ζt. The size of the generation born in t at any time z ∈ [t, t + At] is therefore given
by ζt mt(z− t), reflecting that the measure of each generation declines deterministi-
cally through time. The demographic processes αt, βt and ζt, for varying t, will be
estimated using the English data 1530-1860.
2.2 The economic structure
Now, we describe the economic structure of the model and the corresponding indi-
viduals’ economic decision-making. In order to account for the role of technological
advances in the transition to modern growth, we postulate that there are two distinct
production sectors in the economy, a traditional vs a modern sector. The latter is sub-
ject to technological progress, inducing a rising productivity over time (at a rate say
γt > 0 at date t), while the former has a constant productivity level. If workers are
paid at their productivity level, which we postulate in our model, then the modern
sector will become more attractive over time, inducing a full transition to the modern
sector at a certain point in time. This way of modeling the transition captures the key
mechanism put forward by Hansen and Prescott (2002).
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However, such a sharp transition is by no way realistic; the process is much more
gradual and much less mechanistic than the one outlined above. To generate a much
more realistic picture, we account for human capital formation. Historically, hu-
man capital accumulation and the associated literacy improvements have taken place
gradually over time, and this is likely to crucially matter in the actual shape of the
transition to modern growth. In order to reproduce this feature, we model both the
supply and demand sides of human capital. The supply side is developed in the next
section, and it basically builds on the idea that school foundations depend on the
attendance rates, which are in turn determined by population density.
The demand side mechanism originates in a further difference between the two pro-
duction sectors. Individuals working in the traditional sector have a productivity,
and thus a remuneration, which is independent of their level of human capital. In
contrast, the remuneration of the workers in the modern sector does not only bene-
fit from the (exogenously) rising productivity, it is also determined by their human
capital level. This features a kind of complementarity between human capital and
technological progress in the development process: for technological innovations to
be exploited at their full potential, skilled workers are imperatively needed.2 In par-
ticular, we take the view that technological progress and human capital interact in
a multiplicative way, so that the remuneration of a given worker at a given date t
is the product of her human capital and technological progress at this date t. This
is consistent with a modern sector technology producing an amount Yt at date t of
the good from the multiplicative interaction of the level of technology or productiv-
ity, say exp{γtt}, and the stock of human capital available in the economy, say Ht:
Yt = exp{γtt} Ht.
This makes the development process much trickier provided human capital forma-
tion is costly. We precisely assume that going to school involves a transportation cost,
which is proportional to the distance to the nearest school, and the payment of tu-
ition fees. From the Schools Inquiry Commission (1868a) for example, we learn that
boys can attend a city school from distances up to 20 miles, and a daily consump-
tion of time amounting to more than one hour in the morning and in the evening.
Concerning tuition fees, we know from historical surveys (see again Schools Inquiry
Commission (1868a)) that schools were funded through income from an endowment
2Note that we are invoking this complementarity argument at the implementation stage of innova-
tions, it is even more obvious if one has in mind the prior R&D stage giving rise to innovations.
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and through fees paid by the students’ parents in the period considered. Fees were
imposed in order to supplement the endowment, and parents were willing to pay
fees, provided the fees were not excessive, and the education was suitable.
With such a framework, an individual of a cohort t may not find it optimal to go to
school. Indeed, going to school implies that the individual will pay a cost during
the schooling time, say the first St periods of her life, and can only be paid back (via
wages from the modern sector) after this time. Suppose the problem of the individual
is the maximization of her lifetime resources. Then for a fixed cohort t, there is no
guarantee that the lifetime resources allowed by schooling are superior to the lifetime
revenue directly extracted from the traditional sector. An individual might not go to
school for many good reasons in our framework. This could be for demographic
reasons. In case life expectancy is markedly low for cohort t (which corresponds
to a low parameter αt and/or a high parameter βt in our framework), the return to
schooling is likely to be discouraging given the expected very short remuneration
period. This could be for technological reasons. The (expected) pace of technological
progress, measured by γt in our set-up, might be too slow, which also induces a
low return to schooling. Finally, institutional reasons related to the organization and
location of schools might well yield the same outcome: the absence of schools in the
close neighborhood and/or prohibitively high tuition fees are of course very strong
barriers to schooling.
As a consequence, the decision to go to school and the resulting schooling time de-
pends on an exhaustive set of demographic, technological, geographic and institu-
tional conditions. These conditions change over time, and the schooling decisions
are therefore likely to vary from a cohort to another. Moreover, there is no reason
to believe that all the individuals of the same cohort will take rigorously the same
schooling decision: they hardly go en masse to school. To get the latter desired prop-
erty, we postulate that the individuals of the same cohort may differ in their location,
and in their innate abilities. We postulate that a given individual stays at her location
for ever. In the pre-industrial era, the main reason for households to move was to
reach regions with better employment opportunities or higher wages. In our theoret-
ical model, the same technologies are available everywhere, and henceforth the main
migration engine is shut down. Concerning innate abilities, we postulate that they
are distributed according to a unimodal distribution. We shall use the log-normal
distribution in our experimental studies.
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With the latter ingredients, the demand side of human capital is complete. Within the
same cohort, ceteris paribus only the most gifted and those located closer to schools
will decide to go to school and to spend some time at school. Put in other words, there
exists a threshold value for innate ability, so that individuals with an ability above
(resp. below) the threshold will go to school (resp. remain uneducated). Naturally,
this threshold ability value increases when the tuition fees, the distance to the nearest
school or the alternative remuneration in the traditional sector goes up. The thresh-
old ability value is also sensitive to the demographic and technological conditions:
a higher life expectancy or a faster technological progress should lower the thresh-
old. For individuals above the threshold, the schooling time can be longer or shorter
depending on the same technological, demographic and institutional conditions and
for the same intuitive reasons. In particular, a larger life expectancy, a faster techno-
logical progress or closer schools do induce a longer schooling time, and therefore a
larger human capital level. And of course, ceteris paribus the more gifted individuals
go to school for a longer time.
We nowmove to the supply side of human capital, the school foundations part of our
theory.
2.3 The geographic and institutional structure
Location theory is a field of research that draws on economic geography and oper-
ations research. Its purpose is to model, formulate and solve problems of siting fa-
cilities in order to supply goods and/or services to a spatially dispersed population.
The recent survey by ReVelle and Eiselt (2005) gives a bird’s-eye view of the topic
and its abundant literature, while the reader can refer to Daskin (1995), among oth-
ers, for a deeper introduction. One of the core models of location theory is the Simple
Plant Location Problem (in short SPLP). In words, it can be formulated as follows.
Assume a geographically spread population with known demands for a certain com-
modity that is made available at facilities to be created. Opening a facility involves
incurring a fixed cost, while distributing the commodity entails transportation costs.
The problem is to determine the number, locations, and respective market areas of
the facilities in order to minimize total cost defined as the sum of the transportation
costs to the clients and the fixed opening costs. The SPLP captures one of the essen-
tial features of economic geography: the trade-off between transportation costs and
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economies of scales. The former favor the multiplication of facilities; in contrast, the
latter, expressed by the fixed costs, tend to restrict their number.
In this section, we use an extension of the SPLP to build a theory connecting school
foundations to population density. We choose a very simple geographical setting:
a circle of unit length. We assume that, at every point of time, the cohort of the
newborn generation is uniformly spread over the circle and has the same distribution
of abilities at every location. Clearly, such a representation is inconsistent with actual
population patterns, as one observes strong disparities of density between urban and
rural areas, between cities of different sizes and even inside a city. Nonetheless, we
argue this is a minor point in our setting: rural population accounted for more than
80% of total population by the end of the period we consider. We suppose that every
point of the circle can accommodate a school and that the schools are totally similar
in their characteristics (same services, same quality, same reputation, etc.). It follows
that a pupil will attend the closest school. Moreover, the results of the preceding
section allow us to determine the demand for schooling arising from each point of
the circle as a function of the distance to the nearest school. Given the hypothesis
on the dispersion of the population, it is obvious that the schools will be optimally
located if they are evenly spaced. Hence, for a given number of facilities, we can
determine the literacy rate of the population, the total amount of fees paid by the
pupils and the total transportation cost. Accordingly, the school location problem
boils down to the single question: howmany schools (or classrooms) will be founded
at every date t to educate the newborn cohort?3 But this entails the formulation of an
objective function.
To formulate such a criterion and achieve an acceptable modeling of the schooling
foundation process, one must take a closer look at the relevant institutional arrange-
ments at work in the period considered. And in particular, one needs to clarify the
objectives pursued by school founders in that time. According to the Schools Inquiry
Commission (1868a), the picture is far from uniform and three types of schools can
be clearly distinguished: endowed schools, private schools and proprietary schools.
Endowed schools have usually some income from funds permanently appropriated
to the school. Even in this category, there is a wide variation in their character and
history. Some are part of large charitable foundations, others are run by the Church.
3Here we take the view that classrooms are specific to cohorts. In particular, they are assumed to
be closed when the last person of cohort t graduates.
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Many endowed schools have no exclusive connection. The private schools are the
property of the master or mistress who teaches in them. They “owe their origin to the
operation of the ordinary commercial principle of supply and demand”, according
to the Schools Inquiry Commission (1868a). They provide more individual care and
teaching, but the School Inquiry Commission extensively complains about the quality
of these schools. Commissioners noted that “A really large and flourishing school
is of course a marketable commodity, and sometimes sells well. But it is always a
dangerous purchase for a stranger. (...) when the school declines the house is let for
a shop or a private residence, and the master betakes himself elsewhere.” And also
“ Considered commercially, few descriptions of business seem to require less capital
than the keeping of a private day school of the second order. A house is taken, a
cane and a map of England bought, an advertisement inserted, and the master has
nothing more to do but teach. It is not likely that schools established at so slight
a cost should have buildings well adapted to purposes of education.” These two
quotes stress the commercial nature of private schools. The last of the three classes of
schools is composed of the proprietary schools who belong to a body of shareholders.
They are alike private property. This type of school is more recent, not more than 40
years old in 1860.
Since we don’t have any piece of information concerning the composition of English
schools sorted by each of the three types mentioned just above, we take an agnos-
tic view and consider two different types of institutional arrangements. In the first
scenario, denoted CP for central planning, the optimal number of classrooms is de-
termined by a central authority every year, by maximization of aggregate profits of
the education sector, reflecting that “the purpose of schools was never to save those
from paying who could afford to pay”, as quoted by the Schools Inquiry Commission
(1868a). The benefit drawn from building a school in a given area is roughly the dif-
ference between the tuition fees paid by the individuals in the catchment area of the
school who finally decide to educate themselves (see the previous section), and the
cost of building and/or implementing a classroom.4 The link between school foun-
dations and population density is therefore clear: Since the profitability of a school
mainly depends upon the tuition fees’ revenue, the size of the population in the catch-
ment area of the school should be a major determinant of school foundations.
A second institutional arrangement departs from the central authority view taken so
4This set-up cost can be seen as being net of the possible endowment.
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far. In scenario MA for market, we assume that the density of schools results from a
free entry process: schools are created as long as they earn a positive profit. This can
reflect the functioning of private schools discussed above. It can be readily shown that
model MA is equivalent to a model where a central authority maximizes aggregate
attendance (for example, for religious reasons). In that case, it would create as many
schools as possible, subject to a non-negative profit condition.
As mentioned before, the population size is a major determinant of school founda-
tions because themain source of schools’s revenues, namely tuition fees, does depend
on this demographic factor. This is true for both institutional arrangements reviewed
above. In all cases, no school is viable below a certain threshold of population size (or
of the cohort size, ζt, in our theory). When the newborn population is low, the school
creation or set-up costs are unlikely to be covered, hence no schools are created. Once
the population reaches a threshold value, schools are created at once. The process by
which illiteracy is eliminated is thus initiated by a jump. After this initial impulse, the
process takes place much more smoothly in time depending on the evolution of pop-
ulation density and the attendance rate at schools of the successive cohorts, which in
turn depends on the demographic, technological and geographic factors outlined in
Section 2.2.
Hereafter, we will apply our theory to the England case 1530-1860 in order to disen-
tangle the most salient characteristics and determinants of the English development
process.
3 Data and methodology
We first describe our sources with some key descriptive statistics over the period
of interest. Then, we give a succinct overview of the chosen experimental setting.
The section is ended with some outlines of how the data has been brought to the
theoretical framework detailed in Section 2 (the so-called calibration step).
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Figure 1: Literacy achievements (% population)
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Figure 2: Total factor productivity
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Figure 3: Real wage of unskilled workers
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Figure 4: Mortality: number of survivors at age 40 from 1000 individuals at age 5
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Source: Wrigley et al. (1997).
Figure 5: Population of England aged 5+
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Figure 6: Crude birth rate
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3.1 The data
Literacy
We borrow the series on the literacy rates from Cressy (1980). Figure 1 shows the
evolution over time of literacy rates (average of men and women) for England as
estimated by this author. It suggests that improvements in literacy started as early as
in the sixteenth century. They also experienced a steady rise from 1580 to 1760.
Technological progress
Technological progress, via the productivity growth process γt in our model, in-
creases the attractiveness of themodern sector, and should therefore stimulate school-
ing. We borrow the data on productivity growth from Clark (2001). As illustrated by
Figures 2 and 3, productivity gains in England started to accelerate in the beginning of
the nineteenth century. Consequently, the technological factor cannot account for the
fact that higher literacy rates were achieved two centuries before any significant gain
in productivity. The search for alternative demographic and institutional explanatory
factors becomes indispensable.
Demography
The demographic trends in England over the considered period are taken from the
detailed historical studies of Wrigley and Schofield (1989) and Wrigley et al. (1997).
Recall that we need such a detailed demographic information to be able to identify
the processes αt and βt of the survival law postulated in Section 2.1, and to estimate
the size of the successive generations, ζt. These processes are crucial in the schooling
decisions taken by the individuals of any cohort in our theoretical set-up.
The survival rates and population size evolution can be extracted from the surveys
cited above. Figure 4 presents the survival rate of five years old individuals. It there-
fore abstracts from infant mortality swings to concentrate on mortality during the
active life. We see that adult longevity was first stagnant then declining over the pe-
riod 1600-1700, probably because of the urban penalty associated with the fast growth
of cities. During this period of high mortality, literacy rose continuously, as we have
shown on Figure 1.
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We consider the population aged 6 and more, because it coincides with the concept
of population of our model, disregarding the infants aged 0-5. Looking at the data,
Figure 5 shows that population rose rapidly in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries,
while the seventeenth century was one of demographic stagnation. The correspond-
ing swings in crude birth rates are plotted in Figure 6. We notice that rises in popula-
tion in the sixteenth century correspond to the first wave of improvement in literacy.
School foundations
Concerning school foundations, we collect data from the appendix of the reports of
the Schools Inquiry Commission (1868b). Two lists of schools are provided, together
with their date of establishment. The “endowed grammar schools” taught a mixture
of Latin and practical skills to sons of the middling sort and lesser elite (list in the
Schools Inquiry Commission). The “endowed non-classical schools” were products
of the Charity School Movement, offering protestant socialization and basic skills to
the worthy poor. According to Cressy (1980), although short-lived private schools are
omitted from the list, a check against other sources proves the Commission’s work to
be reliable. We use these lists to compute the number of school establishments per
decade. These data are presented in Table 1.
3.2 Methodology
In order to assess the relative importance of the demographic, technological and in-
stitutional factors in the English transition to modern growth, we take the following
steps.
Step1
Calibration of a benchmark model : We first bring the data into our theoretical model.
To this end, we need to fix the institutional arrangements in the education sector.
We choose to start with the scenario CP, with a central authority determining the
optimal number of classrooms as well as the level of the tuition fee. This will be our
benchmark case, wewill study in further steps how the results are altered if we switch
to other arrangements. Calibration of the benchmark model requires in particular the
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Table 1: School establishments
grammar non-classical
<1500 23 2
1500 - 1510 9 2
1510 - 1520 8 2
1520 - 1530 13 0
1530 - 1540 8 0
1540 - 1550 36 0
1550 - 1560 47 10
1560 - 1570 44 7
1570 - 1580 31 2
1580 - 1590 19 14
1590 - 1600 26 13
1600 - 1610 41 18
1610 - 1620 42 27
1620 - 1630 27 33
1630 - 1640 31 38
1640 - 1650 15 33
1650 - 1660 42 45
1660 - 1670 34 58
1670 - 1680 38 67
1680 - 1690 31 75
1690 - 1700 25 81
1700 - 1710 23 188
1710 - 1720 24 287
1720 - 1730 23 279
1730 - 1740 12 152
1740 - 1750 9 91
1750 - 1760 4 93
1760 - 1770 3 128
1770 - 1780 7 84
1780 - 1790 8 99
1790 - 1800 6 106
1800 - 1810 3 87
1810 - 1820 1 125
1820 - 1830 3 64
1830 - 1840 4 36
1840 - 1850 6 9
1850 - 1860 9 4
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estimation of the three demographic processes, αt, βt, ζt, and the productivity growth
process, γt. It also requires fixing the values of some parameters for which we don’t
have an accurate information. Of course, an extensive robustness analysis will be
conducted later on these parameters. Among them, one can mention the productivity
in the traditional sector, the transport costs, and the discount factor.
Step 2
Counterfactual experiments : As we have explained along the way, there are four
exogenous processes in our economy: αt, βt, ζt, and γt. The first two processes repre-
sent the mortality force, the third one is a measure of birth density force,5 and finally
the last one is the technological progress force. To evaluate the importance of each
of these three forces in accounting for literacy and growth, we run counterfactual
experiments: for example if we aim at evaluating the extent to which technological
progress can explain the observed historical evolution of literacy and growth, we let
this force play alone, which amounts to solving our calibrated model with constant
αt, βt and ζt, and with the estimated γt process as the unique active force. Doing the
same exercise for all forces permits an assessment of the relative importance of each
force in explaining the observed transition to modern growth.
Step 3
Robustness analysis : Obviously the results obtained from the above described coun-
terfactual experiments are conditional to the calibrated model. A minimal require-
ment to test the scientific validity of the results is to resort to the necessary extensive
robustness analysis, which in our case does not only mean performing a sensitivity
analysis with respect to some parameters’ values but also checking how the results
are altered if we move to the alternative institution MA.
Before presenting our main findings from the counterfactual experiments and robust-
ness analysis, we will give a brief summary of the calibration procedure of the bench-
mark model.
5We use the label “birth density” for the process ζt because the main driving force behind consists
in fluctuations of crude birth rate (net of infant mortality). The value of ζt should be interpreted as a
density, since it depends on the normalization of the circle. If we let the circle shrink, this would have
the same effect as increasing ζt.
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3.3 Calibration
The four exogenous processes αt, βt, ζt, and γt should be made explicit. We assume
that all these four processes follow a polynomial function of time. Polynomials of
order 3 are sufficient to capture the main trends in the data.
For the survival function processes αt and βt, the parameters of the polynomial are
chosen by minimizing the distance with the survival functions estimated by Wrigley
et al. (97). These survival functions apply to the age 5-85, and have been accordingly
normalized to 1 at age 5, abstracting from infant mortality. The parameters of the
process for ζt are chosen so that the distance between total population implied by our
model and the observed level of population aged 5 and over is minimized. Finally,
the parameter of the exogenous technological progress is set to follow the estimated
level of total factor productivity of Figure 2.
In a second step, we select a log-normal distribution for abilities, say function g(µ)
where µ stands for ability, which is commonly used to approach the actual distribu-
tion of innate characteristics. We next choose jointly the four following parameters in
order to match four endogenous variables. Since we have little information to cali-
brate those parameters, we chose valueswhich give a reasonable benchmark scenario.
The four parameters are: the variance of g(µ), the transportation cost (in this bench-
mark calibration, we assume that the transportation cost is indexed on technological
progress), the set-up cost, and the productivity or remuneration in the traditional sec-
tor. The four endogenous variables are: 10 schools in 1820 (there are 3000 schools in
our database in 1820, so the scale of the model is 1/25), the level of literacy in 1820
(55%), the change in literacy over the period 1540-1820, and a skill premium of 60% on
average over the period for seven years of education; according to van Zanden (2004)
this was the premium received by skilled craftsmen after 7 years of apprenticeship.
4 Findings
We start with a summary of the properties of the benchmark model. We then come to
the results of the performed counterfactual experiments and sensitivity exercises.
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4.1 Benchmark simulation
The two first bars in Figure 7 report measured (“own estimation”) and simulated
(“baseline”) school density. Each bar represents the change since 1530. The baseline
change in the density of schools is the one which results from the decision process of
the central school authority in the institutional arrangement CP. Both the measured
and the simulated density of schools increase monotonically. The simulation under
estimates school creation in the eighteenth century and overestimate it in the nine-
teenth century, but manages to capture well the overall trend. Literacy presented in
Figure 8 follows closely the creation of schools. Estimated literacy rises in a sustained
way over the period, while for the baseline simulation, there is a first rise prior to
1600, thanks to the creation of the first schools. It is followed by a period with slower
improvements, and, after 1700, by a second period of fast growth.
The density of schools and the level of literacy are globally consistent with the esti-
mated data. Still, a precise mapping is not obtained, but remember that literacy data
covers the ability to sign on marriage register, not school attendance. Notice also the
role of expectations: the sharp acceleration in the end of the period is related to the
anticipation by households of strong productivity gains in the modern sector in the
nineteenth century.
Figure 9 displays GDP per capita. The height of the bar is proportional to the change
in GDP per capita since 1530. Recall that output in the modern sector is postulated
to be the product of the level of technology (or productivity) and aggregate human
capital. The former input can be immediately extracted from the already estimated
productivity growth process γt. The latter input corresponds to the total stock of
human capital of all the generations which are currently at work in themodern sector:
this implies an exact accounting of all individuals of all the co-existing cohorts, who
decide to go to school. Finallywe can compute total GDP as the sum of the production
of the traditional and modern sector minus the transportation cost minus the set-
up cost of schools. According to the baseline there is a period of no growth after
1530, because the economy has to pay the transportation costs of students and the
set-up cost of schools, but does not yet benefit from better educated persons. Next,
the seventeenth century is characterized by very low growth -too low compared to
Maddison data. After this stagnation period, growth starts accelerating after 1700 to
reach 0.7% per annum at the end of the eighteenth century.
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Figure 7: School Density: Baseline and Counterfactuals
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Notice that our GDP numbers should be interpreted as the income generated by the
accumulation of human capital and by productivity growth, without any effect from
the accumulation of physical capital. The difference between the Maddison estimate
and the baseline simulation can be attributed to physical capital accumulation, which
is absent from our model.
4.2 Counterfactual experiments
In a first experiment we consider that birth density and technological progress are
constant over the period; this allows to isolate the role of mortality. Since mortality
drops very late in England (see other data on Geneva and Venice in Boucekkine, de
la Croix, and Licandro (2003)), it does not exert a positive influence before the eigh-
teenth century. The bar “‘mortality” in the figures represents the hypothetical change
in school density, literacy and GDP per capita if mortality was the only factor at play.
If mortality improvements were the only driving force of the industrial revolution,
no school would have been created before 1700 and the literacy rate would have in-
creased by only 6.8% over the period. Compared to the baseline simulation, mortality
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Figure 8: Literacy Rate: Baseline and Counterfactuals
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Figure 9: GDP per capita: Baseline and Counterfactuals
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improvements explain 6.5% of total school creations over the period 1500-1850, 12.8%
of improvements in literacy and 7.5% of growth of income per capita.
In a second step we run a simulation where both mortality and technological progress
are constant. Only the birth density ζt varies, reflecting all changes in population
which are not due to mortality. In this simulation we observe that the rise in popula-
tion can be held responsible for school creation in the sixteenth century as well as for
the early rise in literacy. In the seventeenth century, however, population stagnates,
and school creation stops. In the end, the rise in birth density explains a majority of
total school creations over the period 1500-1850, 27.5% of improvements in literacy
and 7.8% of income growth per capita.
In a third step we run a simulation where both mortality and birth density are con-
stant. Only technological progress is variable. In this simulation we observe that
technical progress cannot explain the timing of school creation and literacy improve-
ments, but it nonetheless explains a major part of changes in the end of the period.
The above results display a neat picture of the English transition to modern growth.
First of all, the counterfactual analysis conducted highlights the fact that neither
productivity increases nor mortality improvements can explain the establishment of
schools at a high rate in the sixteenth century documented in Table 1. Only the rise
in population density can. Secondly, in terms of growth rate of GDP, technological
progress is the predominant engine while increases in longevity play a small role. Of
course, these results need to be corroborated by the necessary sensitivity tests, which
we conduct in the next section.
4.3 Robustness analysis
We provide a robustness analysis to changes in some of our key hypotheses. For
each experiment, we recalibrate the parameters such that the model matches the four
moments reported in Section 3.3.
In the benchmark calibration, transportation costs are indexed on technological pro-
gress. This assumption is probably too pessimistic because transportation costs rela-
tive to other costs have probably been reduced in the eighteenth century.6 To evaluate
6Culp and Smith (1989) mention that in TheWealth of Nations, Smith reviewed 18th-century public
attitudes toward two new forms of wealth creation: “forestalling” and “engrossing”. Both activities
had become possible only as transportation costs dropped.
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the importance of this assumption we have run a simulation where the transportation
cost is kept not indexed; as a consequence, the relative importance of this cost will di-
minish in the eighteenth century and the rise in literacy should be more important.
Themodel is then recalibrated under this assumption. The obtained figures show that
the new baseline with non-indexed transport costs yield very similar results, show-
ing that the previous analysis remains valid whether transport costs are indexed on
productivity or not.
Another assumption wewant to test is the one concerning the evolution of productiv-
ity after 1860. In the baseline, we have assumed that households anticipate correctly
the evolution of future productivity (1% per year). This creates an incentive to ac-
cumulate more human capital in the nineteenth century. To assess the importance
of this mechanism, we run a simulation where agents have myopic forecast beyond
1860, i.e. they suppose that productivity will stay at a constant level (they consider
that the industrial revolution is a temporary phenomenon). This change in assump-
tion does not require any modification in the calibration. Results show that the effect
of lower expectations is quite small.
In another robustness test, we take a lower value of the risk free interest rate, assum-
ing a rate of 3% per year instead of 5%. The other parameters need to be adjusted. A
lower interest rate gives an incentive for households to get more education, and so we
need higher transportation costs to match the observed education investment. In the
figures we observe that the number of schools is very close to the baseline, while lit-
eracy increases faster in the beginning of the period. Using 3% as interest rate would
bring our simulated literacy closer to the estimate by Cressy in the beginning of the
period.
Until now, the robustness analysis indicates that the result on literacy and growth
are little affected by changes in the parameters. This conclusion is however not
valid when the parameter measuring productivity in the traditional sector, wh, is con-
cerned. If for example we index wh on productivity in the modern sector, At, there is
no way to chose the calibrated parameters so as to match the targeted moments, and
in particular the rise in literacy over the period. In fact, the non-indexation of wh is
the main mechanism through which technical progress plays a role in the model. If
we shut down this channel by indexing wh, we reduce drastically the role of techni-
cal progress, and we are left with the two other factors, mortality and birth density,
which together explain about 40% of the observed rise in literacy.
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We finally study the robustness of the results to the assumption on the institutional
arrangement. we have run simulations for the model MA in which schools are cre-
ated in a decentralized way as long as there are profit opportunities. Comparing CP
to MA we retain two conclusions.
First, that the timing of the take-off for school creation does not vary across models; in
both cases it starts as early as in 1540. Second, with the market solution, the density of
schools increases much faster than with a central authority. This very fast rise entails
important fixed costs for the economy, which slow growth compared to the central
authority case. The model with the market solution is therefore not as good as the
model with a central authority to reproduce the acceleration in growth during the
early nineteenth century because it would imply too many school establishments.
At last, one issue that is potentially important but very complex involves the model
spatial structure. Space is modeled using a circle of unit length, with schools spread
evenly over it. This is a one dimensional model of location. In real life, of course, the
English countryside is two dimensional. To see whether the predictions of the one
dimensional space can be transposed to a more realistic set-up, let us consider the
infinite plain. There are basically two ways of covering the plane with regular shapes
of the same size: squares and hexagons. It is well-known from the literature on central
place areas (see, e.g., Beckmann 1968) that the latter is more efficient than the former,
hence we will consider an infinite covering of the plane with hexagons of the same
size. The relevant descriptor for our problem is the density of centers, i.e., the number
of centers in a unit area. An equivalent descriptor is the edge length of the hexagon.
Assume a simpler case where all children have to attend school and consider the free-
entry case. Then it can be shown that the density of school is a linear function of the
density of population, exactly as it is the case in the uni-dimensional case. It follows
that the relationship between the number of schools and the population density is a
linear one, whatever the dimensionality of the space.
This result prompts two additional comments. First, in the one dimensional world,
the average travel distance is linearly related to the number of schools, implying that
the average travel distance falls proportionally to 1/density. However, in the two-
dimensional world, the average travel time is proportional to 1/(square root of pop-
ulation density). Whether this may affect our estimations of the importance of chang-
ing population density in explaining rising schooling is an open question. Recent
papers in the optimal location literature (see for example Morgan and Bolton (2002))
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have provided some estimates in some special cases. Using their results in a simple
example, we find in that in the two dimensional world, if the number of schools dou-
bles, then the average distance decreases by a factor of about 0.267, while, in the one
dimensional world, doubling the number of schools decreases the average distance
by a factor of 0.25. Hence, the difference between 1/density and 1/(square root of
density) is compensated by a scaling factor which makes the difference between the
two worlds acceptable. In the more complex model, the discrepancy will depend,
among other things, on whether tuition fees will be set lower to attract students from
more distant places in the two dimensional space.
Second, while space is generically two-dimensional, most of human activities at any
time use to be organized along some principal routes. Our circular representation of
space could well fit such an organization, and that is precisely why it is so frequently
adopted in economic geography.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we build up a theoretical model with the main demographic, economic
and institutional factors traditionally considered to crucially matter in the transition
to modern growth. In particular, we have provided a formal link between population
density and the provision of schools, i.e., due to economies of scales, higher densities
allows one to reduce the cost of education per capita and to increase the level of
human capital. This is in agreement with a trend of literature about agglomeration
economies (see, e.g., Duranton and Puga (2004) and Henderson (2005)).
We apply our theory to the England case over the period 1530-1860. Using a cali-
brated version of our model, we have measured the impact of mortality, birth density
and technological progress on school density, literacy and growth through a set of
counterfactual experiments. We find that one third of the rise in literacy over the pe-
riod 1530-1850 can be directly related to the effect of density, while one sixth is linked
to higher longevity and one half to exogenous total factor productivity growth.
Some concluding remarks are in order. First of all, one has to mention the reduced
role of mortality declines relative to other factors in explaining England’s develop-
ment over the period studied. This goes at odds with other studies on other countries
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(see Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro, 2003, for example) but is not that surpris-
ing if we have in mindWrigley and Schofield’s study advocated in the introduction of
this paper. Since we rely on this study to calibrate the demographics of the model, it is
a fortunate outcome of our simulations that mortality declines do not play the major
role. Second, it is fair to acknowledge that while themodel used is properly calibrated
to capture the main observed demographic and technological characteristics of the
English transition, it is built on several simplifying assumptions that could be hope-
fully relaxed in future work to bring the model closer to reality. Including physical
capital accumulation and human capital externalities should be the next challenges.
Working on a two-dimensional representation of space and determining whether it
really matters compared to the one-dimensional space of this paper would also be an
interesting and innovative extension.
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A Note: From one dimensional to two dimensional space
One issue that is potentially important but very complex involves the model spatial
structure. The story in the paper is that there are fixed costs for creating a school,
so higher density allows for creation of more schools, shorter travel time, and more
schooling. This is modeled using a circle of unit length, with schools spread evenly
over it. This is a one dimensional model of location. In real life, of course, the English
countryside is two dimensional. The qualitative predictions of the one dimensional
model will carry over to the two dimensional world. But can the quantitative predic-
tions be transposed too? This is a priori not obvious.
A.1 School density and population density
How to implement our model in such a two-dimensional space? Obviously the local
demand for education depends only on the transportation cost for its spatial com-
ponent, thus only on the distance to the school and not on the question whether
we are working in one or two dimensions. Next, we should choose the represen-
tation of the 2-D space. We chose to work with a circle to avoid the boundary effects
which would entail useless and noninformative computational difficulties. The bi-
dimensional equivalent of the circle is the sphere. But working on a sphere raises
some difficulties. Indeed, whereas it is possible to divide the circle in equal parts for
any number of schools, this is not possible on a sphere. For instance, if we can open
5 schools, there is no way to place them so that the market areas are equal. It follows
that artifacts are likely to occur and blunder the interpretation of the results. More-
over, the optimal placement of the facilities is a hard geometrical problem. Therefore
we decided not to follow this track.
We can consider the infinite plain. There are basically two ways of covering the plane
with regular shapes of the same size: squares and hexagons. It is well-known from
the literature on central place areas (see, e.g., Beckmann (1968)) that the latter is more
efficient than the former, hence we will consider an infinite covering of the plane with
hexagons of the same size. The relevant descriptor for our problem is the density of
centers, i.e., the number of centers in a unit area. An equivalent descriptor is the edge
length of the hexagon.
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In this setting the problem is still hard to solve. Assume a simpler case where all
children have to attend school and consider the free-entry case.
We assume first a infinite straight line with a uniform density of children ρ. All the
children are obliged to go to school. The fixed cost for opening a school is f and the
tuition fee is equal to k. In the free-entry process a school will be opened provided it
covers its fixed cost. Hence
kρℓ = f
where ℓ is the catchment area of the school, which is thus
ℓ =
f
kρ
Then the density of schools is
δ1 =
1
ℓ
=
kρ
f
which is linear in the density of children.
We now consider the two-dimensional space and we assume it is covered by a grid of
hexagons. Let R denote the ray of the circumscribing circle. The area of the hexagon
can easily proved to be
S =
3
√
3
2
R2
It follows that the optimal ray is the solution of the equation
kρS = kρ
3
√
3
2
R2 = f
hence
R =
√
2 f
kρ3
√
3
It follows that the measure of the catchment area is
S =
f
kρ
and the density of schools is
δ2 =
1
S
=
kρ
f
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which is also linear in the density ρ. It follows that the relationship between the num-
ber of schools and the population density is a linear one, whatever the dimensionality
of the space.
A.2 Distance to nearest school and density
We have shown above that the number of schools on the circle is
δ1 =
1
ℓ
=
kρ
f
It follows that the total distance to the schools equals
dtot = ρδ12
∫ 1
δ1
0
rdr = ρr2‖
1
δ1
0 =
ρ
4δ1
so that the average distance of the pupils to the schools in 1-D amounts to
d¯ =
dtot
ρ
=
1
4δ1
=
f
4kρ
So that doubling the number of schools decreases the average distance by a factor of
0.25.
We can follow Morgan and Bolton (2002) and compute the total distance to the center
of an hexagon of radius R:
dtot = ρ
√
3
8
(4+ log 27)R3
Remember that the size of the area of the hexagon is given by
S =
3
√
3
2
R2
Multiplying this quantity by ρ, we obtain the total population in the hexagon. Hence,
the average distance to the center is given by
d¯ =
dtot
ρS
=
4+ log 27
12
R ≈ 0.608R
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If we take the optimal radius found above, we find
d¯ ≈ 0.3772
√
f
kρ
= 0.3772
√
1
δ2
If the number of schools doubles, then the average distance decreases by a factor of
about 0.266718.
This gives some hints on the magnitude of the error we made by computing our
results in 1-D rather than in 2-D.
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